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interests are not found. The hypothesized influence of electoral rules is strongly 
conditioned by the small size of the legislature in Wales. 
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Whether – and how – institutions and electoral rules shape the activities of politicians is 
a research question with a long pedigree. If, as Mayhew contends, re-election is an 
objective shared by all politicians, or ‘the goal that must be achieved over and over if 
other ends are to be entertained’ (1974: 16), identifying how institutional and electoral 
rules shaping shape members’ re-election strategies is of primary importance. 
Electoral systems have long been considered among the most significant 
institutional constraints that shape the activities of political actors (for example, Carey 
and Shugart 1995). It is argued that candidate-centred electoral systems such as single 
member plurality encourage office-seeking incumbents to cultivate voters’ support in 
their home district, while party-centred systems such as closed-list proportional 
representation (PR) focus politicians’ attention on their internal party ‘selectorate’ in 
pursuit of a winnable list position (Gallagher 2005, Depauw and Martin 2009). Testing 
these assertions is frequently confounding because we cannot untangle the effects of 
electoral rules from the many cultural, social and political characteristics of a given 
country. However, in mixed-member systems some researchers have exploited an 
apparent opportunity to evaluate the simultaneous operation of two electoral rules while 
controlling for all other observed and unobserved variables (Moser and Scheiner 2005).  
In theory, mixed systems encourage members elected from a single member district 
(SMD) to behave differently from those elected from the PR-list, a bifurcated incentives 
structure termed a ‘dual incentives’ or ‘dual mandate’ effect (e.g. Lancaster and 
Patterson 1990, Stratmann and Baur 2002). However, other researchers (e.g. Ferrara et 
al. 2005, Thames 2005, Manow 2015) caution that any differences in behaviour will be 
overwhelmed by a lack of independence between the two electoral contests – 
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‘contamination’ – that frequently derives from dual candidacy rules that incentivize 
candidates to cultivate a re-election vote from both the SMD and PR-list ballot routes at 
the next election (Ferrara et al. 2005). 
The UK’s devolved legislatures offer an important case study of this ‘dual 
mandate’ framework. First, the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales 
have both been elected by mixed-member voting systems since their establishment, 
which should theoretically reduce the potential of ‘hangover effects’ (Crisp 2007) from 
the operation of prior electoral rules. Second, a ban on dual candidacy was imposed 
seven years after the National Assembly’s establishment, formally separating SMD and 
PR candidates in Wales, and offering an unusual set of circumstances for investigating 
the contamination problem. While Wales’ dual candidacy ban should in theory more 
clearly divide SMD and list members, the greater size of the legislature in Scotland may 
allow more flexibility in the assignment of committee roles according to Scottish 
members’ re-election interests. A larger chamber size, therefore, may be more 
conducive to distinguishing ‘dual mandate’ effects.  
The article is structured as follows. To begin, I consider the connection between 
electoral systems and behavioural incentives in mixed electoral systems, and explain 
why Scotland and Wales offer a useful test of ‘contamination’ that has confounded 
academic work to date. After outlining hypotheses, data and variables, I test committee 
assignments for differences between constituency and list members elected in the two 
legislatures, present results, and conclude.  
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1. ELECTORAL INCENTIVES FROM THEORY TO EVIDENCE 
As the discipline has developed and incorporated new institutionalist understandings of 
the constraints and opportunities that can shape political outcomes, electoral systems 
have been considered fertile ground for investigating how legislators might adapt to the 
different accountability mechanisms intrinsic to different voting systems (Gallagher 
2005). Under party-centred systems such as closed-list PR, incumbents rely on their 
party’s internal selectors for re-election, so seek approval from this ‘selectorate’ to 
boost their re-election prospects. Conversely, under candidate-centred systems such as 
single-member plurality and single transferable vote, incumbents also rely on the 
personal support of voters for re-election, which incentivizes constituency-related 
activities (Gallagher 2005, Depauw and Martin 2009). But since the direct effect of 
electoral rules cannot be isolated from other cultural, social and country-specific 
influences in a given political system, researchers cannot directly identify how legislator 
behaviour would change if different electoral rules were employed (Stratmann and Baur 
2002; Ferrara et al. 2005). 
The rapid adoption of mixed electoral systems since the 1990s has however 
provided an opportunity for researchers to test how majoritarian and proportional 
principles of representation shape actor behaviour in similar settings (e.g. Lancaster and 
Patterson 1990, Stratmann and Baur 2002, Moser and Scheiner 2004). Voters 
participating in mixed-member elections cast their vote via two separate ballot papers: 
one for a candidate in a single-member district (SMD) and one for a party list with seats 
allocated via a proportional formula. Researchers can seemingly evaluate the effects of 
different electoral rules by comparing the outcomes of the district- and list-based 
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components of the election, while simultaneously controlling for all observed and 
unobserved country-specific variables (Moser and Scheiner 2005). 
If the operation of parallel electoral rules bifurcates re-election incentives, two 
‘legislator types’ may emerge in mixed-member systems. PR-list candidates, who are 
selected by party leaderships or regional party organizations and ranked on closed lists 
that cannot be re-ordered by voters, should have a greater incentive to focus their appeal 
on this internal ‘selectorate’ and to shirk time-consuming constituency casework 
demands. Conversely, because SMD members’ re-election success should depend at 
least partly on their appeal to a geographic constituency, constituency members should 
face incentives to cultivate a personal vote independent from party loyalty (Lundberg 
2006). 
But while theoretically straightforward, finding an empirical means to test such 
assertions has proved challenging. Lancaster and Patterson’s (1990) study of the 
German Bundestag focused on the interests of SMD members to pursue pork-barrel 
projects in their districts. But more recent analyses acknowledge that two institutional 
characteristics in many mixed-member legislatures may limit the possibilities for 
discerning bifurcated patterns of behaviour between members. First, high levels of intra-
party voting discipline in parliamentary systems reduce the significance of roll-call 
votes as evidence for a ‘mandate divide’. Second, government control of money bills in 
many parliamentary systems weakens the ability of members to secure geographically-
targeted spending projects for their constituencies (Martin 2011).  
Recent work has therefore tended to explore members’ legislative committee 
assignments to investigate the interactions of electoral rules and behavioural incentives. 
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Translating Mayhew’s assumption that legislators are motivated to win re-election, 
Stratmann and Baur (2002) hypothesize that certain committees in the Bundestag better 
enable SMD members to serve their specific electoral constituencies and thereby 
increase their likelihood of re-election. Where SMD members select (or are assigned to) 
committees that allow them to serve their constituencies (such as agriculture or 
construction), PR legislators join committees that allow members to promote their 
party’s interests (such as defence or development), thereby increasing their own chances 
of a high-enough rank on their party list to win re-election. 
But despite assertions that committee assignments (or other observable 
manifestations of legislator behaviour in mixed systems) might offer researchers a 
controlled comparison, several scholars (Bawn and Thies 2003, Ferrara et al. 2005, 
Hainmueller and Kern 2008) have cautioned that this supposition is ‘only correct to the 
extent that the two tiers are truly independent from each other; the operation of each tier 
must be unaffected by the presence of a second tier characterized by a different set of 
electoral rules’ (Hainmueller and Kern 2008: 2). Certain institutional features of mixed 
electoral systems may ‘weaken or altogether break the link between seat type and 
behaviour’ (Ferrara et al. 2005: 203), a ‘contamination’ that invalidates the assumption 
of independence between the tiers. 
Contamination between the two tiers has overshadowed many recent empirical 
studies of the controlled comparisons framework. In a comprehensive study of roll-call 
votes by legislators in Ukraine and Italy, Ferrara et al. find that ‘seat type is a poor 
predictor of legislative voting… Once factional affiliation is accounted for, the effects 
of seat type and dual candidacy are washed away’ (2005: 110). Likewise, Thames 
(2005) finds that mandate divides in the operation of mixed systems in Russia, Ukraine 
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and Hungary were evident only in the Russian Duma – a legislature with a very weakly 
institutionalized party system. Even in Germany, Gschwend and Zittel’s (2016) re-
evaluation of committee assignments in the Bundestag finds that while members with 
strong local ties are more likely to be members of committees that can engage in fiscal 
particularism, a member’s mode of election does not appear to be associated with their 
subsequent committee assignments. 
Chief among the reasons for this scepticism is the presence of dual candidacy, 
which gives candidates a ‘fallback’ or ‘insurance’ seat via the party list should they fail 
to be elected in a constituency. Dual candidacy should blunt incentives for legislators to 
specialize because ‘the prospect [of] being nominated to both a party list and an SMD 
race allows incumbents to hedge their bets, focusing some of their attention on 
demonstrating their partisanship to party leaders and some on showing their dedication 
to local constituents’ (Ferrara et al. 2005: 103). That 80 percent of German legislators 
are dual candidates at their election reinforces incentives to engage in both party and 
constituency work (Manow 2015). 
Given the preponderance of dual candidacy in legislatures elected by mixed-
member proportional systems, evidence for a ‘dual mandate’ effect – and perhaps the 
question of electoral incentives on politicians more generally – remains inconclusive. 
But if cases exist in which such institutional configurations differ, re-investigation 
might shed further light on this frequently confounding question in the field. 
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2. THE UK’S MIXED-MEMBER LEGISLATURES AS A TEST OF THE ‘DUAL 
INCENTIVES’ FRAMEWORK 
As we have seen, testing bifurcated incentive structures in mixed electoral 
systems poses a particular challenge to researchers. Many observable distributive 
features such as pork-barrel politics are not readily available to legislators in 
parliamentary systems, and dual candidacy encourages members to ‘hedge their bets’ by 
cultivating both party and home district electorates. But with one unique voting rule and 
two significantly different chamber sizes, the UK’s devolved legislatures offer an 
innovative case test for the framework. 
Upon their establishment in 1999, the mixed member proportional (MMP) 
system selected for the National Assembly for Wales and Scottish Parliament was a 
deliberate departure from the UK’s First-Past-the-Post tradition. The Scottish 
Parliament is comprised of 73 SMD members and 56 closed party list members 
allocated on a compensatory basis from 8 electoral regions; the Welsh legislature is 
significantly smaller and achieves a lower level of proportionality with 40 SMD 
members and 20 closed party list members elected in 5 electoral regions. While the first 
two elections to both institutions permitted candidates to stand on both the constituency 
and regional ballots, UK legislation passed in 2006 prohibited dual candidacy at the 
third and fourth elections to the National Assembly for Wales in 2007 and 2011, a ban 
that was unique among MMP systems (Scully 2014).1 Subsequent legislation reversing 
this ban became effective for the fifth election in 2016; however, the ban permits the 
evaluation of two full Welsh legislative terms in which dual candidacy was permitted, 
and two in which it was prohibited. 
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Scotland’s MMP system has never banned dual candidacy, but its Parliament 
(with 129 members) is far larger than its Welsh counterpart (with 60 members). This 
significant size difference offers a test of whether a larger chamber might enable greater 
flexibility in members’ committee assignments that better accord with theorized re-
election interests.  
Whether Scottish and Welsh list members behave differently from their SMD 
colleagues has been posed elsewhere in the literature. Lundberg (2006) uses survey 
evidence to compare legislator attitudes in Scotland and Wales with two German 
Landtage, finding some evidence that SMD members were more oriented towards 
constituency service, whereas list members were more concerned about supporting their 
party’s prospects and working with interest groups. Bradbury and Mitchell (2007), also 
using survey evidence, find that constituency work was broadly prioritized by 
constituency members, but list members’ constituency focus was stronger than 
expected. Researchers have also focused on perceived or real ‘electoral poaching’ (list 
members shadowing SMD members), particularly in Scotland where a ban on dual 
candidacy was not imposed, finding mixed evidence (Carman 2005, Carman and 
Shephard 2007). And statistically analysing work-related variables including the 
number of bills sponsored, parliamentary motions tabled, rebellion votes, and the 
amount spent on advertising constituency surgeries, Parker and Richter (2018) argue 
that Scottish SMD members are more likely to hold surgeries and less likely to attend to 
parliamentary functions, while the reverse is true for regional MSPs whose names are 
not listed on the ballot. 
As with other examinations of the dual incentives framework, studies of the 
devolved legislatures have also focused on committee assignment. Battle (2011) finds 
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that PR members of the Scottish Parliament running exclusively on the list have the 
most committee assignments and are most active in the legislature. But there is scope to 
take existing work much further. Battle does not appear to exclude ministers, deputy 
ministers or other office holders who do not sit on committees; or controls for party 
affiliation that may influence a member’s number and type of committee assignments. 
While dual candidacy and chamber size differences make Wales and Scotland 
instructive cases, there are qualifications to account for context-specific variation in 
both legislatures. First, in the case of Wales, although the adoption of the dual 
candidacy ban in 2006 is of particular advantage in investigating contamination effects, 
list members can (and do) choose to run for re-election in a constituency, weakening 
independence between the two tiers. Irrespective of the reasons for this - perhaps 
because the SMD ballot gives candidates somewhat more control over their own 
electoral fates, or the pejorative language of ‘two classes’ of elected representatives that 
has been a common criticism of MMP systems in New Zealand (Vowles 2005, Ward 
1998) and Scotland and Wales (Lundberg 2006) – any such propensity would reduce the 
divide separating Wales’ SMD and list members. Second, institutional characteristics 
identified elsewhere in the literature, including chamber size, strong party systems, 
bicameralism, term lengths and committee organization (Downs 2014), may at least 
partially counteract any bifurcation by seat type. With only 60 elected members who 
can be required to serve on at least three committees, the number of assignments in 
Wales far exceeds comparable levels in larger MMP legislatures, such as the Bundestag 
where each member is generally a full member of only one committee. In such capacity-
limited cases, pressures to populate the committee system may override individual 
incentives to cultivate a re-election vote.  
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3. TESTING ELECTORAL INCENTIVES IN WALES AND SCOTLAND 
The previous section argued that the UK’s devolved legislatures offer a useful 
case test of a framework that has long engaged studies of mixed-member systems. But 
the basic theoretical assumption of this framework - that SMD candidates will promote 
constituency activities to best support their re-election prospects – is intrinsically related 
to candidate selection rules. If nomination and re-nomination procedures are tightly 
controlled by central parties, then the assumption that SMD candidates will promote 
constituency activities to cultivate a personal re-election vote in their district may not 
transfer to the UK cases.  
Indeed, initial selection rules for SMD candidates would appear to contradict 
the theoretical connection. In both cases, constituency selections are conducted under a 
series of rules specified by each party’s central organization which vary considerably 
between the parties.2 But once elected to an SMD seat, deselection of an incumbent is 
extremely rare: among the 214 constituency members elected between 1999 and 2016 
deselection has occurred only four times, twice in Wales and twice in Scotland.3 Such a 
low probability of deselection allows members to focus on retaining their seat against 
other parties, and members’ prospects for returning to the legislature once elected are 
therefore not limited to the same extent by central party control. Their behaviour might 
therefore be anticipated to mirror the traditional cultivation of a personal vote as 
theorized in the literature. 
Likewise for list members, party influence over reselection is an important 
underpinning of the assumption that party-vote cultivation is the best path for re-
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election. Cross-nationally, list selection is associated with centralized control as parties 
attempt to select the preferred candidates of the leadership (Epstein 1980), although 
Bradbury (2009) argues that there has been a tendency towards decentralization of list 
selection in both Wales and Scotland. Empirical testing of committee data can perhaps 
shed new light on whether the theorized connection between PR members and party-
focused activities in the legislature is theoretically sound.  
The prominent role for committee activity in Scotland and Wales’ unicameral 
legislatures makes committee assignments an appropriate focus for studying the effect 
of institutional rules on legislator behaviour. Unlike the House of Commons, strong 
formal powers and conventions have given Scottish committees a major role in shaping 
legislative output, powers deriving from the early decision to create permanent, 
specialist committees with a relatively small number of members; committee 
deliberation at two separate stages in the legislative process; and an ability to introduce 
legislation and initiate inquiries, call witnesses and demand government documents as 
part of such inquiries (Cairney 2006).  
Wales’ committee system has been less stable due to a rapid accumulation of 
devolved competences since 1999; however, committees do play a major role in 
legislative output and scrutiny. The number and size of committees has varied in 
response to new powers and new organisational arrangements. During the first two 
sessions (1999-2003 and 2003-2007), the Assembly did not consider primary legislation 
and therefore did not require legislation committees; instead, standing committees and 
subject committees were created to shadow the newly-created ministerial portfolios. 
Following a legislative change in 2006 which allowed the third term of the Assembly 
(2007-2011) to enact primary legislation, separate committees were established to 
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examine legislation and scrutinize the executive. From the fourth term (2011-2016), the 
Assembly has full legislative powers in 20 policy areas4 without the need to obtain prior 
competence from the UK Parliament, and the committee structure has been reformed to 
more closely match dual-role Scottish committees.  
In both legislatures, committee places are allocated to party groups in 
proportion to their representation in the main chamber. Each party group informs the 
cross-party commission that coordinates parliamentary business which of their members 
will take up their allocation of committee places. The number of members on each 
committee varies according to remit and by parliamentary session.5 
Although committee appointments are made in the final round by each party’s 
leadership and chief whip, in practice members indicate their preferences to their party 
and allocations are an iterative process that can account for members’ constituency 
interests. For the Welsh Conservatives for example, although the Leader and Chief 
Whip formally decide members’ assignments and there is no distinction between 
constituency and list members in the assignment decision, members can express their 
committee interests and have the option of rejecting a committee offer if they are firmly 
opposed (Chair of the Welsh Conservative Group, personal communication). For Plaid 
Cymru, although committees are generally allocated to the party’s spokesperson for 
each portfolio area, other assignments are decided by the Business Manager and agreed 
by the Group, a decision in which member interests, availability and work balance are 
taken into account. Subject committees are generally preferred to committees dealing 
with the workings on the Assembly, and members who demonstrate a particular 
constituency interest in a subject area, such as members from rural constituencies being 
assigned to committees dealing with the environment and farming, may be prioritized 
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for a corresponding committee assignment (Plaid Cymru Deputy Leader, personal 
communication). Likewise in Scotland, SNP committee appointments are decided by 
the Whip; but this decision is again iterative and takes MSPs’ personal interests, 
previous employment and constituencies into account (Scottish Government whip, 
personal communication). While cognizant of the challenge of populating every 
committee in the Welsh case, there would therefore appear to be sufficient flexibility in 
members’ committee assignments to test whether an electoral incentive structure 
features in the number and type of committee assignments. 
Testing the ‘dual incentives’ framework using two self-constructed datasets of 
members’ committee assignments in Scotland and Wales, I propose a series of 
hypotheses.6 First, if SMD members have a re-election interest in cultivating a personal 
vote by engaging in constituency service, and if list members have a party-vote 
incentive to promote their party’s interests in the legislature, the total number of 
committee assignments should be lower for SMD members than for list members. 
Following Martin (2011), this hypothesis should hold in candidate-centred systems 
where members cannot engage in pork barrel earmarking through committee work. In 
such systems (as in Wales and Scotland), and if SMD members have a re-election 
interest, these interests are better served by engaging in constituency work rather than 
participating in the legislative committees. 
H1: SMD members will have fewer committee assignments than list 
members 
 
Although H1 surmises that a high committee workload can potentially reveal 
something about SMD and list members’ responsiveness to different re-election 
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constituencies, not all committees are created equal. If members seek to cultivate a 
geographically-based personal vote, they might be best assisted in this goal by 
participating in committees that can help them engage with issues affecting their 
constituency, such as committees whose remit includes major industries in their area. 
With re-election motivations as the theoretical underpinning, Stratmann and 
Baur (2002) classify certain Bundestag committees as either ‘district’ committees that 
allow members to direct support to projects in their constituencies, or ‘party’ 
committees that would help PR members serve party interests. But transplanting this 
bifurcation to the UK’s devolved legislatures is problematic: not only do certain 
German (federal) ministerial portfolios not correspond with those in (substate) Wales 
and Scotland, but legislators in Westminster systems cannot normally secure 
geographically-targeted spending for their constituencies. 
To operationalize the ‘usefulness’ of a committee assignment in cultivating a 
constituency vote, I therefore construct another measure of a committee’s possible value 
in serving a member’s constituency service goals. Constituency service interests should 
be best assisted by committee work that has a relatively high profile and allows a 
member to give attention to a pertinent local issue in their district, or to promote the 
interests of major local businesses or industries, such as agriculture for SMD members 
representing rural areas.  
Tables 1 and 2 group together by function or portfolio area Scottish and Welsh 
committees since 1999, ranked by the number of mentions for each committee in a 
major national newspaper (the Scotsman/Scotland on Sunday and the Western Mail in 
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Wales).7   Higher profile committees would be expected to receive a larger number of 
media citations, and are ranked higher in each table. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As one of the most prominent devolved policy areas, health has been a major 
issue in Scottish and Welsh election campaigns since devolution. Welsh parties have 
registered to appear on the ballot paper alongside the name of local hospitals,8 and a 
General Practitioner opposed to health cuts was elected as an independent in 2003 in a 
Scottish constituency.9 With the health committee having a high profile in both 
legislatures, assignments might therefore offer a platform for SMD members to engage 
with constituency campaigns that assist their re-election goals.10 Likewise, an Enterprise 
or Economy committee appointment might give members an opportunity to support 
major industries or employers in their constituency, as may the Rural 
Affairs/Environment committee for rural SMD members. Other high profile 
committees, such as Justice or Education, are of generalized national importance rather 
than necessarily ‘useful’ for SMD members appealing to an issue of important local 
campaigning concern to maximize their chances of re-election.11  
Moreover, in contrast to SMD members, and if members are motivated to win 
re-election, then their list colleagues should prioritize party ‘selectorate’ interests to 
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ensure placement in a winnable position on the party list.  List members might therefore 
have an incentive to engage with committees that support their party’s interests in the 
legislature and exist to keep the parliament or assembly running, rather than those that 
are high profile among the general public. Three groupings of committees in both 
legislatures that meet these criteria are standards, petitions, and subordinate 
legislation/legislation/legislative affairs. 
That the ‘usefulness’ of an assignment differs for SMD and list members can be 
stated in two hypotheses as follows:  
H2: SMD members will be overrepresented (and list members 
underrepresented) on committees that can best assist in cultivating a 
personal constituency vote 
H3: List legislators will be overrepresented (and SMD legislators 
underrepresented) on committees that focus on parliamentary functions  
Separately, the 2007-2016 prohibition of dual candidacy in Wales offers a 
useful test of whether the option of running in both a constituency and for an 
‘insurance’ regional seat prompts incumbent legislators to hedge their bets. If dual 
candidacy blunts the incentives for legislators to specialize, we would expect members 
to focus both on re-nomination to a winnable position on the party list and on local 
constituency campaigns to cultivate a personal re-election vote. If this is the case, we 
would expect any evidence of a mandate divide to be stronger in Wales between 2007 
and 2016: 
H4: Evidence of a ‘mandate divide’ will be more pronounced where dual 
candidacy is prohibited 
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Conversely, section 2 hypothesized that a small chamber would be expected to 
at least partially counteract any theorized ‘dual mandate’ effects, because even if such 
incentives are present, the attraction of a particular assignment could be overridden by 
the sheer challenge of populating a committee system from a limited pool of elected 
members. Independent from any dual candidacy ban, a bifurcated pattern of committee 
assignments should be tougher to discern in small legislatures. A fifth hypothesis can 
therefore be specified as follows: 
H5: Evidence of a ‘mandate divide’ will be more pronounced in larger 
legislatures 
The rest of this article examines these propositions, first outlining the variables 
and data, then presenting the results of statistical modelling. 
 
4. VARIABLES AND DATA 
To identify the presence or absence of a mandate divide in the operation of the UK’s 
mixed-member systems, I analyse a series of variables focusing on different aspects of 
members’ committee service. Following cues in the literature with respect to the 
possible incentive effects of mixed systems on legislator behaviour, the main 
explanatory variable of interest for all hypotheses is the seat type of members elected to 
both legislatures since their establishment in 1999; assigned the value of (1) for SMD 
(or ‘First-Past-The-Post’) seats, and (0) for list (or ‘PR’) seats.  
Hypothesis H1 (Total Committee Assignments) is examined by totalling each 
member’s number of committee assignments per annual legislative session.12 Where 
exact dates of committee memberships were available, and if a member served on a 
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committee for only part of an annual legislative session, they were credited with 
membership if their appointment lasted at least six months.13 
Hypothesis H2 (constituency-service committees) is tested by a dummy 
variable with the value of (1) for membership of the Health committee, 
Enterprise/Economic Development/Economy committee, or the Environment/Rural 
Affairs committee, and (0) otherwise. Likewise, H3 (parliamentary function 
committees) is a dummy variable taking a value of (1) for members on the standards, 
petitions, or subordinate legislation/legislation/legislative affairs committees, and (0) 
otherwise. 
H4 (dual candidacy prohibition) is tested in the Wales model by an interaction 
of the main explanatory variable (SMD seat) and a dummy variable for the two 
legislative terms during which dual candidacy was banned (2007-16). I estimate one set 
of models for each of hypotheses H1-H3 that include the interaction term around the 
dual candidacy ban, and a second set of models that report effects for the entire period 
analysed, without the interaction variables. This interaction term is not included in the 
Scotland model because dual candidacy has never been prohibited at Scottish 
Parliament elections. 
H5 (Evidence of a ‘mandate divide’ is more pronounced in larger legislatures) 
is analysed by comparisons of model results for Scotland and Wales for each of 
Hypotheses H1-H3. 
The data comprise the electoral, biographical and committee assignment history 
of every member of the Scottish and Welsh legislatures in the first four legislative 
periods since their establishment (1999-2003, 2003-07, 2007-11, and 2011-2016). 
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Scottish committee memberships were obtained from the Scottish Parliament website. 
Committee memberships in the first and fourth terms of the National Assembly for 
Wales were available at that institution’s website; assignment data for the second and 
third terms were unavailable from that source but were instead obtained from The Wales 
Yearbook, an annual reference book for government and public affairs in Wales.  
116 individuals served in Wales and 252 in Scotland between 1999 and 2014, 
representing 900 and 1,942 annual observations for each serving member in the two 
datasets respectively.  Given the length of this time series and number of members, two 
units of observation are possible: members’ initial assignments in the first year of each 
legislative term; or annual observations, one per member per year. Annual observations 
are useful in identifying within-term changes such as committee reassignments, 
ministerial promotions, or changes to party affiliations. However, they also overcount 
members who remain on the same committee for more than one year (as is usual), 
thereby exaggerating the significance of any behavioural differences by reducing the 
standard errors. As a result, this analysis settles on observing patterns of committee 
assignment and member behaviour in the first year of each legislative term.  
I make a further adjustment for members that have served for more than one 
term. Multiple observations of the same member – even if their assignments are 
recorded only at the start of each term – could artificially shrink the standard errors by 
treating each assignment as independent from all other observations. I therefore 
estimate standard errors that are clustered on the individual member.  
I also include a set of controls to consider other factors that may account for 
differences in SMD and PR legislator types in mixed systems. The safety of a member’s 
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seat might influence their behaviour in the legislature, including their total number of 
committee assignments or the types of committees on which they serve. But while there 
are many potential ways to operationalize a safe seat variable, all of these are 
imprecise.14 Here, for SMD members, Safe Seat is an above-median vote margin in their 
constituency ballot at the last election.15 List members are considered to hold a safe seat 
if their list seat allocation was among the top two from the four seats available in each 
Welsh electoral region, or within the top 3 (of 7) in Scotland.  
Because ministerial appointments reduce the total number of available 
legislators from the same party to serve on committees, a dummy variable for 
Backbench Member of the Lead Governing Party is a necessary control for non-
governmental members of the governing party (or lead coalition partner) that are 
required to take up a disproportionately large number of committee posts. Because 
committee seats are awarded according to the number of seats held by each party in the 
chamber and not by the government as whole, the lead governing party is awarded the 
preponderance of government posts and will face a tougher task in filling their large 
number of committee spots from a proportionately much-reduced backbench. This is 
particularly important in Wales, where a full-size committee system and government are 
drawn from a disproportionately small legislature.16  
Given the specialist subject matter for certain committees, I also test whether a 
member’s career background is associated with their subsequent assignments to certain 
committees. Because there are too few observations to include directly in the main 
model, I analyse in a separate table whether (1) members with a previous legal 
background are more likely than others to be assigned to the justice committee; (2) 
whether members with a previous medical career are assigned to the health committee; 
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and (3) whether members with a previous career in education are assigned to the 
education committee. 
Two potentially important determinants of committee assignment are not 
directly included in the model. First, ministers and deputy ministers are generally not 
assigned to committees (except, and somewhat unusually, during the first two terms of 
the Welsh Assembly),17 and the Presiding Officer or Deputy Presiding Officers are 
generally assigned to specific legislative business committees. These members are 
therefore removed from the sample. Second, although previous studies have directly 
analysed a candidate’s dual candidacy at the time of their initial election (e.g. Ferrara et 
al. 2005, Battle 2011), the direction of causality means that dual candidacy is 
challenging to include as a variable in the model. In considering re-election incentives, 
it is not a member’s dual candidacy at the last election but their interest in securing a 
high party list ranking and a winnable constituency at the next election that is relevant 
to legislator motivations. This temporal discrepancy creates the possibility of reverse 
causality in modelling the determinants of committee assignments: only those 
explanatory variables that precede in time the dependent variable can be included on the 
right hand side of a regression equation. Although not directly included, the prohibition 
of dual candidacy in Wales still informs the overall model because the ‘firewall’ 
preventing candidates from running on both ballots would be expected to sharpen any 
evidence of a dual mandate via the coefficient on SMD seat (H4).18 
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5. RESULTS 
Tables 3 and 4 present results from multiple regression models estimating the effect of a 
member’s seat type on three dependent variables for Scotland and Wales respectively. 
The first set of models for each table analyses the determinants of a member’s total 
committee assignments (H1), a count variable analysed by Poisson regression. The 
second set (H2) estimates the determinants of assignment to committees that are 
theoretically of greater interest to SMD legislators (‘Constituency Service 
Committees’); and the third (H3) examines those committees that should be of greater 
interest to PR legislators (‘Parliamentary Function Committees’). Because a member’s 
appointment to a particular committee type is a binary rather than a count variable, a 
Probit model is used to analyse hypotheses H2 and H3. To interpret these regressions I 
employ Hanmer and Kalkan’s Observed Values method (2013).19 Poisson regression 
coefficients and marginal effects calculated by this method are shown in Tables 3 and 4. 
[TABLES 3 and 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Taking first the results for Scotland in Table 3, and analysing hypothesis H1 
which predicts a smaller committee workload for SMD members than PR members, the 
effect on SMD seat is in the predicted (negative) direction and is statistically significant. 
Consistent with expectations, Scottish list members have a higher committee workload. 
Membership of the lead governing party is also strongly significant, implying that 
backbench members of the governing party (or lead governing party in a coalition 
government) have a higher total number of committee assignments than members of 
other parties. 
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In contrast, and analysing hypotheses H2 and H3, there is no evidence of a dual 
incentive structure that would encourage SMD members to participate in committees 
serving a theorized constituency re-election interest (hypothesis H2) or to serve on 
‘parliamentary function committees’ that might serve a party re-selection interest 
(hypothesis H3). Indeed, the sign on SMD seat for hypothesis H2 is in the opposite 
direction to that hypothesized – although this effect is likely related to the magnitude of 
the negative sign on constituency members’ total committee assignments for H1. For 
H3, although the negative sign is of the anticipated direction it lies just outside 
significance, and the effect is again likely related to the strength of the workload 
measure for constituency members in H1. There is therefore no evidence that PR 
members are significantly more likely to participate in committees that have a low 
external profile but keep the legislative process operating. 
Table 4 reports results for Wales and includes the interaction terms that are 
associated with the ban on dual candidacy in Welsh elections between 2007 and 2016. 
For each of H1, H2 and H3, I include one set of models that includes the interaction 
terms to facilitate evaluation of H4. Because dual candidacy was banned at the halfway 
point of the National Assembly for Wales’ institutional life, these terms analyse whether 
the marginal effects of seat type on committee assignments was substantively different 
either side of the ban. But because patterns of assignment may be related to other 
factors than the dual candidacy ban, particularly the small size of the National 
Assembly (H5), I also include a set of models that does not include the interaction 
terms. 
All results for Wales show weaker effects for seat type than in Scotland. Taking 
first those models that include interaction variables, there are no significant effects on 
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SMD seat at all if interaction terms for the dual candidacy ban are included; indeed, the 
only significant term in the results is found for members of the lead governing party – 
which was Welsh Labour for all four Assembly terms analysed here. Backbench 
members of the Labour party therefore had a higher total number of committee 
assignments than members of other parties, reflecting the challenge of simply 
populating the committee system in Wales.  
Because constituent terms in interaction models cannot be interpreted directly, I 
calculate predicted values and marginal effects for all four interactions of interest (1 
[SMD Seat] and 0 [List seat]; against 1[Ban period] and 0[No ban period]) and illustrate 
these using interaction plots contained in the online appendix. For each of hypotheses 
H1, H2 and H3, all three interaction plots exhibit overlapping confidence intervals 
which further help us to interpret the insignificant coefficients between the ban and no 
ban scenarios. The effect of representing an SMD seat is therefore not significantly 
different for either H1, H2 or H3 either side of the ban on dual candidacy. 
Where interaction terms around the dual candidacy ban are excluded, there is 
some evidence that SMD seat matters for committee assignments. As in Scotland, the 
effect on SMD seat for hypothesis H1 (in the no interaction model) is in the predicted 
(negative) direction, although the magnitude of this effect is lower and significant at 
only the 10 percent level.  
Irrespective of whether the interaction terms are included, there is no evidence 
for the theorized incentives to seek assignment to committees that might serve a party- 
or constituency-based re-election interest (hypotheses H2 and H3). As in Scotland, there 
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is therefore no evidence that Welsh constituency members are overrepresented on 
certain types of committees relative to their list counterparts.   
As a result, and contrary to hypothesis H4 that any evidence of ‘mandate 
divide’ should be stronger in Wales (H4), not only are the interaction terms around the 
dual candidacy ban not significant, but the coefficient and significance of the SMD 
variable is stronger in Scotland than for Wales (although both are of the expected 
direction). This lends support for hypothesis H5 which suggested any mandate divide 
would be more pronounced in larger legislatures, where the challenge of populating the 
committee system is far less acute. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 5 considers alternative reasons for assignment to particular specialist 
subject committees; namely whether a member’s career background is associated with 
assignment to the subject committee in which they have prior expertise. Because there 
are so few observations of assignments compared with non-assignment across the 102 
Scottish committees and 63 Welsh committees in the sample, and because these 
specialist subject committees are not grouped with others as they are for hypotheses H2 
and H3, these are analysed separately with no controls except for (the essential) control 
membership of the lead governing party. 
Analysing Table 5, there is good evidence that members with a previous legal 
background are subsequently assigned to the justice committee in Scotland (justice is 
not a devolved field in Wales); and good evidence that members with a previous 
medical career are assigned to the health committee in both Wales and Scotland. The 
magnitude of the marginal effects are particularly strong in relation to the health 
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committee in both legislatures. Conversely, there is no association between a member’s 
previous career in education and assignment to the education committee in either Wales 
or Scotland. 
There is therefore some evidence that assignments to more specialist subject 
committees attract members with an employment background in the policy field 
(although not for educators). In relation to presumed re-election incentives these results 
do not replicate the clear-cut effects claimed elsewhere for the German MMP system. 
Corresponding to hypothesis H5, this can perhaps partly be explained by the difficulty 
of populating a committee system from a small pool of legislators. Previous studies 
have generally observed large legislative settings such as Germany, Italy, Hungary, 
Russia, Ukraine and Japan. The results analyse here suggest that chamber size is a 
crucially important contextual variable in limiting members’ freedom to respond to 
behavioural cues from the electoral system. 
But that small legislative size dilutes (or overwhelms) any theoretical incentives 
for members to choose specific committee assignments cannot be the end of the story. 
In relation to H1, a workload split between PR and SMD members was found in Wales 
and particularly Scotland. In both legislatures, PR members were associated with a 
higher number of committee assignments: they are, to coin a term from Battle (2011), 
the ‘workhorses’ of the committee system.  There are therefore observable differences 
between list and constituency members in both institutions, implying that ‘two member 
types’ has some explanatory purchase in understanding the operation of legislatures 
elected by Mixed Member Proportional.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Research into the devolved legislatures of the UK can provide a valuable contribution to 
the large but contested scholarship considering the influence of electoral rules on 
legislator behaviour. The vastly-different chamber sizes of the Scottish Parliament and 
National Assembly for Wales, and Wales’ unique ban on dual candidacy between 2006 
and 2016, offered an unusual set of conditions for testing a ‘dual mandate’ framework 
that is distinct from previous empirical tests in this field. 
Statistical modelling of two datasets of members’ biographical and electoral 
history and committee assignments offers some evidence of ‘two legislator types’ that 
withstand a series of controls. PR and SMD members have different committee 
workloads: List members serve on more committees when membership of the lead 
governing party is controlled for. There is also evidence that justice and health 
professionals are assigned to the respective subject committee once elected. But the 
clear-cut effects claimed for the Bundestag are not evident: there is no evidence that 
Welsh and Scottish members are generally able to choose assignments that might assist 
in cultivating a party re-election vote, and in Wales there was no difference in patterns 
of committee assignment either side of a dual candidacy ban imposed after 2006.  
Given the small size of the Welsh legislature in particular, and the strong party 
discipline characteristic of traditional Westminster systems in general, the pattern of 
heterogeneity in the findings indicates that any dual mandate effects are strongly 
conditioned by contextual factors. While strong parties are able to provide an element of 
committee workload relief for SMD members facing greater casework demands from 
their constituencies, this does not extend to personal re-election interests that might be 
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advanced through a particular committee assignment choice. Such a split finding would 
appear to substantiate the importance of candidate selection and re-selection procedures 
underpinning members’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Depauw and Martin 
(2009) find that incentives to cultivate a personal vote are weaker where parties operate 
selection rules that give greater control to party leaderships; in such circumstances, 
incumbents instead prioritize advancement in the government ranks to raise their 
profile. This strategy generally reinforces party unity by discouraging any personal vote 
cultivation that leads to members acting against their own party’s position. But if the 
process of re-selecting SMD candidates and ranking PR lists has become less 
centralized over the period (see section 2), we might anticipate that responding to party 
leadership cues would be a weaker strategy for both SMD and PR members. In that 
case, PR members might find direct appeals to party members a more effective re-
election strategy than internal legislative work that might appeal to party leaderships. 
Such a result would comport with recent evidence for Scotland that constituency MSPs 
focus more on constituency surgeries and list MSPs more on visibility-enhancing 
activities such as tabling motions and sponsoring bills (Parker and Richter 2018). 
Above all, this analysis finds small chamber size to be a critical limiting factor 
for a quantitative analysis. Future research ought to complement quantitative work with 
qualitative research, such as surveys or semi-structured interviews with Assembly 
members, and existing surveys-based work undertaken elsewhere in the field (e.g. 
Lundberg 2006; Mickler 2013, 2018).  
Existing research on electoral incentives in mixed systems has perhaps 
obscured important institutional constraints such as strong parties and the assumption 
that the legislature is big enough to allow specialisation. As shown by evidence of 
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differentiated workload management between SMD and PR members in Wales and 
Scotland presented above, parties and institutions have made innovative adaptations to 
these constraints, some of which align with divisions between legislator types. Given 
the importance of institutional effects such as legislature size and party management in 
the operation of such systems, a more systematic understanding of context 
conditionality and institutional adaptations to constraints is central to a more unified 
approach in this research field.  
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NOTES 
 
1 Note dual candidacy has been banned in several legislatures elected by Mixed Member 
Majoritarian voting rules, including Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Ukraine. 
2 Examples include Welsh Labour’s ‘constituency twinning’ to select one female and 
one male candidate from seats that are geographically-proximate and of approximately 
equal ‘winnability’ (see Mitchell and Bradbury 2004). 
3 See online annex for these four cases. 
4 A 21st policy area (devolved taxes) was added by the Wales Act 2014 
5 During the first two Scottish parliamentary terms (1999-2007), most committees had 
seven, nine or eleven members; in the Third Session most had eight members. 
6 See online annex for office-seeking motivations posited elsewhere in the literature. 
7 See online annex for explanation for choice of newspapers. 
8 See online annex for examples. 
9 Strathkelvin and Bearsden constituency, won in 2003 by Dr Jean Turner. 
10 E.g. ‘Withybush hospital ‘downgrade’: More than 700 protest at Welsh Government 
plans’, Wales Online, 18 June 2014. 
11 See online annex. 
12 Excludes the regional committees of the National Assembly (1999-2007) to which all 
Assembly Members were assigned. 
13 Where exact dates of membership were not available (Wales 2003-2011), members 
were credited if their membership was recorded in The Wales Yearbook. See online 
annex for additional explanation. 
14 See online annex for further analysis. 
15 Previous election performance is not a perfect indicator of seat safety in subsequent 
elections, but it is a reasonable proxy and has been adapted as an explanatory variable in 
the literature (e.g. Heitshusen, Young and Wood 2005; Ferrara et al 2005). See online 
annex for discussion of alternative operationalisations of the Safe Seat variable. 
16 See online annex for results from an alternative operationalisation of this variable. 
17 See online annex for historical explanation. 
18 See online annex for additional explanations for excluding dual candidacy as a 
standalone variable in the model. 
19 Instead of setting all other explanatory variables to particular values (such as their 
sample means or modes) to calculate marginal effects for the variable of interest, this 
method holds each of the other explanatory variables at their observed values for each 
observation in the data, calculates the marginal effect for each of these observations, 
then takes the mean average over all of these cases. 
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Table 1: Scottish Committees, Grouped by Functional Area, Ranked by Number of 
Citations in the Scotsman and Scotland on Sunday 
Committee (Grouped across 
terms by Function or Portfolio 
Area) 
No. of Citations per Term 
1st 2nd 3rd  4th  
(to 
05/2014) 
Total  Average  
1. Justice 323 133 119 155 730 183 
2. Enterprise/Economy 177 132 122 142 573 143 
3. Education 351 31 54 97 533 133 
4. Finance 102 213 123 62 500 125 
5. Health 226 85 65 46 422 106 
6. Rural Affairs 259 60 24 8 351 88 
7. Standards 230 52 37 14 333 83 
8. Audit/Public Accounts 81 73 79 33 266 67 
9. Public Petitions 92 57 63 27 239 60 
10. Local Government 115 37 56 17 225 56 
11. Equal Opportunities 77 14 16 25 132 33 
12. European/External Relations 62 27 6 13 108 27 
13. Subordinate Legislation 38 6 4 3 51 13 
Total 2,133 920 768 642 4,463 1,116 
 
 
Table 2: Welsh Committees, Grouped by Functional Area, Ranked by Number of 
Citations in the Western Mail  
Committee (Grouped across 
terms by Function or Portfolio 
Area) 
No. of Citations per Term * 
1st * 2nd 3rd  4th  
(to 
05/2014) 
Total  Average  
1. Education 145 98 92 81 416 104 
2. Health 104 70 83 147 404 101 
3. Enterprise/Economic Dev’t 152 68 92 86 398 100 
4. Environment/Rural Affairs 124 98 58 84 364 91 
5. Audit/Public Accounts 93 75 98 85 351 88 
6. Culture / Communities 184 58 26 45 313 78 
7. Finance - - 112 47 159 80 
8. Petitions  - - 38 50 88 44 
9. Local Government 28 11 ** 45 84 28 
10. Standards 27 24 5 14 70 18 
11. Legislation/Subordinate 
Legislation/Legislative Affairs*** 
12 3 2 18 35 9 
12. Equal Opportunities 7 16 11 - 34 11 
13. European / External Relations 9 4 11 - 24 8 
Total 885 525 628 702 2,740 685 
Citations obtained by LexisNexis search of committee names and variations thereof, 
grouped by functional areas across parliamentary terms. 
* Data commences 1/1/2001   
** Not included because of cross-counting with the Health committee grouping  
*** Not including the five Legislation committees from the Third Assembly 
  
Table 3: Electoral System Effects on Committee Assignments - Scotland 
    
 H1: Total Committee 
Assignments (Scotland) 
 
H2: Constituency Service 
Committees (Scotland) 
 
H3: Parliamentary 
Function Committees 
(Scotland) 
      
SMD Seat 
 –0.200*** 
(0.060) 
 –0.024 
(0.048) 
 –0.047 
(0.040) 
Safe Seat 
0.053 
(0.049) 
 0.022 
(0.040) 
 –0.041 
(0.037) 
Backbench Member of Lead Governing 
Party 
0.468*** 
(0.057) 
 0.100** 
(0.040) 
 0.095** 
(0.040) 
Constant 
 
0.119** 
(0.050) 
  
- 
 - 
- 
      
Pseudo R-squared -  0.01  0.02 
Model Poisson  Probit  Probit 
Note: H2, H3 show Average Marginal Effects calculated by Hanmer and Kalkan’s ‘Observed Values’ method (2013); these figures are not coefficients. 
Standard Errors clustered on Individual legislators shown in Parentheses. *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01.  N (Scotland)=431, (Wales)=183. Pseudo R-
squared increases significantly if office holders are included in the regression rather than removed from the sample.  
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Table 4: Electoral System Effects on Committee Assignments - Wales 
 H1: Total Committee 
Assignments 
 
H2: Constituency Service 
Committees 
 
H3: Parliamentary Function 
Committees 
 
Interaction No Interaction  Interaction No Interaction  Interaction No Interaction 
         
SMD Seat 
 –0.098 
(0.100) 
–0.129* 
(0.077) 
 0.092 
(0.114) 
0.128 
(0.086) 
 –0.068 
(0.128) 
–0.123 
(0.110) 
            Ban Period 
0.100 
(0.088) 
-  –0.015 
(0.105) 
-  0.019 
(0.095) 
- 
 
            SMD Seat x Ban Period 
-0.052 
(0.114) 
-  0.068 
(0.142) 
-  –0.109 
(0.130) 
- 
 
Safe Seat 
0.005 
(0.061) 
0.003 
(0.061) 
 0.137* 
(0.076) 
0.135* 
(0.076) 
 0.051 
(0.073) 
0.054 
(0.073) 
Backbench Member of Lead 
Governing Party 
0.271*** 
(0.076) 
0.276*** 
(0.076) 
 0.023 
(0.085) 
0.017 
(0.085) 
 0.158 
(0.108) 
0.165 
(0.108) 
Constant 
0.716 
(0.067) 
0.768*** 
(0.054) 
 - 
- 
- 
- 
 - 
- 
- 
- 
         
Pseudo R-squared - -  0.029 0.027  0.022 0.018 
Model Poisson Poisson  Probit Probit  Probit Probit 
Notes: As Table 3. Predicted values and marginal effects for values of interest in the Online Appendix. 
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Table 5: Biographical Connections and Committee Assignments, Wales and Scotland 
Dependent Variable =  H5A: Justice Committee 
Assignment 
 
H5B: Health Committee 
Assignment 
 
H5C: Education Committee 
Assignment 
Variable 
Scotland Wales  Scotland Wales  Scotland Wales 
         
Backbench Member of Lead Governing Party 
0.047 
(0.030) 
n.a.  0.034 
(0.024) 
0.049 
(0.065) 
 0.030 
(0.027) 
0.070 
(0.054) 
Previous Professional Experience 0.094*** 
(0.035) 
n.a  0.166*** 
(0.059) 
0.279*** 
(0.105) 
 0.004 
(0.035) 
0.067 
(0.058) 
         
Pseudo R-squared 0.03 n.a  0.06 0.04  0.01 0.02 
Model Probit n.a  Probit Probit  Probit Probit 
Notes: As Table 3. 
